By Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar
This e-book constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the sixth overseas Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2006, held in big apple, new york, united states in July 2004 as a part of AAMAS 2004.
The 15 revised complete papers offered have been conscientiously chosen from 39 submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The papers assemble novel paintings from such various fields as desktop technology, Operations examine, synthetic Intelligence and dispensed structures that concentrate on modeling, implementation and evaluate of computational buying and selling establishment and/or agent ideas over a various set of products. they're geared up in topical sections on mechanism layout, buying and selling brokers, and instruments.
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Extra info for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York,
Arrow: “Social Choices and Individual Values,” Wiley and Sons, New York, 1963 3. C. -A. Gerard-Varet: “Incentives and Incomplete Information,” Journal of Public Economics 11, pp. 25-45, 1979 4. -S. C. Ely: “Ex-Post Incentive-Compatible Mechanism Design,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, Northwestern University 5. H. Clarke: “Multipart pricing of public goods,” Public Choice 11, pp. 17-33, 1971 6. E. Ephrati and J. S. Rosenschein: “The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents,” Proceedings of the 9th National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, pp.
Such a mechanism makes life easy for the agents since they do not have to speculate to obtain the best outcome. It also avoids choosing a suboptimal outcome because of such speculation. A well-known mechanism for achieving IC is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) tax () mechanism. It assumes that the mechanism chooses an outcome that maximizes the sum of agents’ utilities (called the Pareto-eﬃcient outcome, PE), and makes each agent pay a tax that is calculated so that the agent cannot gain from misreporting its utility.
Proof. The above is a result of the incentive-compatibility of the mechanism. Since the goal of the centre is to achieve efficiency, then given truthful reports, the centre will achieve efficiency. Proposition 3. The mechanism is individually rational. A mechanism is individually rational if there is an incentive for agents to join it rather than opting out of it. We begin by assuming that the utility an agent derives from not joining the mechanism is 0. Then, we need to prove that the utility an agent derives in the mechanism is always ≥ 0.
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York, by Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar